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Summary – This paper presents a new methodology to assess security of interconnected 
systems that have a large penetration of wind power production, through the evaluation of the 
impacts in the transmission lines of one control area following a sudden loss of wind power 
production. This approach exploits functional knowledge generated off-line and artificial 
neural networks to provide a way for fast evaluation of the security degree. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The need to decrease CO2 emissions is leading to an increase of the penetration of wind 
power and other renewable Dispersed Generation (DG) technologies in the power system 
generation mix. At the same time, the number of cross border power transactions is increasing 
due to an electricity market liberalization trend. The conjunction of these two facts creates an 
increased use of the interconnection and main transmission lines that may lead to very 
stressed operating conditions. In fact, the presence of large shares of wind power production, 
characterized by an intermittent nature and limited predictability may provoke an increase in 
deviations of power flows in tie lines regarding programmed flow exchanges among control 
areas. Changes in wind power production may also result from a sudden disconnection of a 
large number of wind generators as well as other DG units in one area, due to the triggering of 
their protection relays following grid disturbances. Although Automatic Generation Control 
(AGC) takes care of interchange power flow deviations, it will take some time to eliminate 
them, leading to quasi-steady-state overloads in main transmission lines, which may provoke 
a set of undesired cascading events like load curtailment or even system collapse. 
Transmission System Operators (TSO) have been defining the levels of acceptance of wind 
generation and other DG on the basis of deterministic (n-1) steady-state security studies for 
worst case scenarios. More recently TSO have started conducting also dynamic behavior and 
stability analysis studies following grid disturbances and subsequent operation of DG 
protection relays. Again these studies have been conducted for worst case scenarios, leading 
to severe limitations on system wind generation integration. Therefore, in order to increase 
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wind penetration, interconnected systems with large wind power production require a close 
system security assessment, through the prediction of electrical current flows in main 
transmission lines after the occurrence of system disturbances or changes in wind power 
production. Such prediction (for current or alternative operating conditions) requires full 
dynamic simulations of the interconnected system, including AGC operation, which is 
incompatible namely with the management of secondary reserves time frame requirements. 
This means that dynamic security assessment becomes a key functionality for such TSO 
dispatching centers, requiring new tools able to provide a fast and accurate forecast of 
interconnected systems security. 
For this purpose an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) based approach was designed to 
emulate in a very fast way a set of security indices, characterizing the level of security of an 
interconnected system, following a disturbance that provokes the disconnection of a large 
share of wind power and other DG generation. In order to gather enough information about 
interconnected power systems behavior, an algorithm able to generate operating conditions in 
a two area control interconnected system was developed. This includes a full dynamic 
simulation stage where system behavior is computed and the variables of interest are kept in a 
knowledge data set to be further used for the ANN design. 
This paper describes the first stages of the approach developed so far and its application to a 
two area control test system. 
2 POWER SYSTEM MODELING 
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Fig. 1. Single-line diagram of the interconnected transmission system 
In this research, a test system was created based on the Portuguese – Spanish interconnected 
system, meaning that two control areas were considered. The single-line diagram of the test 
system is presented in Fig. 1. Control area 1 presents one approximation to the Portuguese 
transmission system, and control area 2 represents an equivalent of the Spanish/European 
system. In order to reduce the power system dimension, without losing relevant information, 
all the generating units of control area 1 are equivalent machines modeling similar generators 
operating in parallel in the same power plant. Regarding that this research was focused on the 
security of control area 1, the neighboring system was modeled by one busbar with equivalent 
generation units. 
In each control area, thermal (T), hydro (H) and wind (W) generating units were considered. 
In control area 2, nuclear (N) units were considered as must run units and not participating in 
secondary frequency control. A set of other DG power plants, considered in area 1, are related 
with mini-hydro and cogeneration units, which do not participate in frequency control. All the 
large hydro and thermal units were considered to participate in primary and secondary 
frequency control. 
In order to obtain the dynamic behavior of thermal, hydro and nuclear units, the usual 
corresponding local frequency regulator models as described in [1] were used, including also 
the voltage regulator behavior adopting an IEEE1 model type. Wind generators were modeled 
by a classical asynchronous machine model. The other DG units were modeled as 
synchronous generators with voltage regulator and constant mechanical power. 
The AGC system AGC response is also modeled, where the traditional integral control 
approach was used, adopting the configuration described in [2]. According to this 
configuration, besides keeping the system frequency and interchange power between control 
areas in the specified value, changes in power production are distributed among generators 
through participation factors in order to maintain generating units at the most economic 
operating conditions. In the adopted model, participation factors were calculated considering 
that thermal production cost is 10 times the hydro power production cost. A time frame of 2 
seconds was considered for AGC operation [1]. For all the remaining parameters of the power 
system dynamic model, typical values were considered, and were extracted from the full 
Portuguese - Spanish interconnected system. 
3 DATA SET GENERATION 
In the research presented in this paper, a general Data Set (DS) generation methodology was 
developed, in order to gather knowledge about the dynamic behavior of two interconnected 
power systems regarding a pre-defined disturbance. In this procedure, a structured Monte 
Carlo sampling method [3] was applied, because it provides a well distributed and highly 
resolved DS throughout a pre-defined operating range. In fact, security assessment techniques 
based on automatic learning demand a DS enclosing enough functional knowledge. However, 
although trying to cover all possible operating conditions of the power system, several 
operating restrictions were mandatory to be considered in order to filter out unrealistic 
scenarios, and therefore decrease computational time without compromising the knowledge 
data quality. Besides, this also avoids power flow convergence problems, in face of unfeasible 
conditions. 
The developed automatic procedure consists of the following main steps: 
 Structured Monte Carlo Sampling: Based on typical operating conditions, a sampling 
method is applied in order to produce several realistic operating scenarios of the system, 
characterized by different settings of: system load level, wind power production levels, 
other DG production levels, and import/export levels. These conditions were defined 
regarding their potential influence on the interconnected system dynamic security. Based 
on available statistical data about wind power production of the Portuguese power system, 
the following dependencies were considered among wind parks of area 1: 
 m)1 area in Production Wind(CFb)Park Wind(CF ×+=  (1) 
where CF  is the capacity factor, being defined has the power production divided by the 
installed capacity of the units in operation; m  and b  are the slope and the y-intercept of 
the best linear regression relating )Park Wind(CF  to )1 area in Production Wind(CF . In 
order to introduce diversity in the DS, in each sampled scenario, m  is randomly sampled 
between m)deviation( dardtans3×±  and b  between b)deviation( dardtans3×± . 
 Scheduling of conventional units: For each sampled scenario, the identification of a     
pre-define number of different scheduling solutions is performed. To obtain a scheduling 
solution, in each control area the units are sequentially connected, until the load supply is 
satisfied, constrained by: 
- pre-defined connecting order among power plants of each control area; 
- minimum and maximum number of available units in each power plant, being the 
availability of some specified units sampled in order to provide diversity among 
scheduling solutions; 
- minimum and maximum technical limits of each unit; 
- primary control reserve criteria of each control area: >PR capacity of the largest unit 
in operation; 
- secondary control reserve criteria of each control area [4]: bbmaxLaSR 2 −+×> ; 
being Lmax = maximum estimated load in that period; a = 10 MW and b = 150 MW. 
 Dispatch of conventional units: For each created scheduling scheme, a dispatch module 
randomly distributes the insufficiency of power production by the conventional units that 
were defined to be in operation by the scheduling module, considering again their 
production limits. 
 Power Flow: For each dispatch solution, a load flow is solved in order to identify all the 
system operating conditions. 
 Feasible Steady-State Solution: Before starting the dynamic simulation, the feasibility of 
the power flow solution is checked regarding the following operating restrictions: 
- min and max allowed voltage values in the transmission system: [ ]1.1;93.0V ∈  p.u.; 
- MVA capacity of synchronous generators; 
- by acting on the following parameters: 
- power factor in PQ synchronous generators; 
- voltage in PV synchronous generators. 
 Dynamic Simulation: For each steady-state operating point, the evaluation of system 
dynamic behaviour is performed in order to obtain the system security indices following 
specified system disturbances that affect wind power generation. 
 Data Set Recording: After each dynamic simulation analysis, a pattern is added to the DS, 
being characterized by a set of candidate attributes and security indices. In this study, the 
following security indices were analysed: 
- quasi-steady-state post-fault value of electrical current in the transmission lines: 
FINALIif  (120 s after the disturbance, involving therefore AGC operation). 
The following candidate attributes were considered: 
- Active load in area 1; 
- Import level from area 2; 
- Number of connected units and active power, in each power station of area 1 and 2; 
- Initial pre-fault value of the electrical current in the transmission lines: INIIif . 
For the security structure design, the DS gathered in this way was afterwards randomly 
splitted in two sets, creating a learning set (LS), with 3/5 of the patterns used for training, 
and a testing set (TS), with the remaining patterns used for over-fitting control and 
performance evaluation. An ANN was then designed to provide numerical estimates of the 
currents in the system transmission lines, following the selected disturbance, exploiting as 
inputs the attributes mentioned before. 
4 ANN TRAINING 
In this research, an ANN based tool was chosen, since it performs generally better than 
concurrent tools in the fast dynamic security evaluation of power systems [5]. For ANN 
training, the MATLAB Neural Network Toolbox tool was used [6]. ANN parameters were 
found through the BFGS Quasi Newton Algorithm. Before starting the training stage, training 
and testing patterns were normalized to have zero mean and a standard deviation of one. This 
removes offset and measurement scale problems. To perform over-fitting control, besides 
considering a maximum epochs number, when the testing error increases for a specified 
number of iterations, the training is stopped. 
The used ANN was a two-layer feedforward network, with tan-sigmoid transfer function in 
the hidden layer and a linear transfer function in the output layer. To choose de number of 
hidden units, a rule described in [7] was used. According to this rule, the number of hidden 
units of a single hidden layer network is given by: 
 
1rn
1
A
NLS
++
×
  (2) 
where LSN  is the number of learning patterns; A  is a constant factor [ ]10;5∈ ; n  is the 
number of input attributes; and r  is the number of output variables. 
5 NUMERICAL RESULTS 
5.1 DATA SET SETTINGS 
Fig. 2 presents the considered installed capacity, for each type of generating power, and the 
minimum and maximum load values considered for the studied power system. For the DS 
generation, load was considered to change from light load scenarios to peak load scenarios. 
The import level from area 2 was considered to change between 0 and 1900 MW. For the 
scheduling and dispatch of the conventional units, two different situations were taking into 
account – a thermal based and a hydro based scenario – which defined two different 
connecting order solutions between conventional units in the scheduling procedure. System 
security was evaluated relatively to a short-circuit that occurred at a sensitive bus of the 
transmission system (bus number 15 of Fig. 1), with a duration of 100 ms, leading to the 
disconnection of the nearest disperse generating units (wind and other DG) due to the 
triggering of the under-voltage protection relays, which actuate if the voltage drops bellow 0.8 
p.u.. 
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Fig. 2. Installed capacity and minimum and maximum load considered for the studied power 
system 
5.2 DATA SET RESULTS 
Using the methodology previously described, 
9122 patterns were generated, divided by the 
following 4 scenarios: off-peak and peak hydro 
based scenarios, and off-peak and peak thermal 
based scenarios. The system was considered to be 
insecure if, 2 minutes after the disturbance, any 
transmission line current is above the electrical 
current technical limit. Obviously, the number of 
insecure patterns in the DS strongly depends of the acceptable over-current settings. 
On the other hand, electrical current limit 
has a minimum value on hot summer days 
and a maximum value on cold winter days. 
The number of obtained insecure patterns, 
regarding all these aspects, is summarized in 
Table I. For instance, by considering a 
summer period for all the generated patterns 
and a line current security threshold of 
120%, 810 patterns of the DS are classified 
as insecure. Regarding these settings, 9 lines 
were identified to lose security within the 
DS patterns, namely the ones identified in 
Fig. 1 with the (++) symbol. If a 100% line 
current limit is considered, 3675 patterns are 
classified as insecure, where 15 lines are 
identified to become overloaded, namely the 
ones identified in Fig. 1 with (+) or (++). 
These lines are also identified in Table II. As 
we can see from the analyses of this Table, 
the fact of being a hydro or thermal based 
dispatch scenario strongly affects each transmission line security. In fact, as it can be seen by 
the following analysis, the security of transmission lines is strongly dependent from the 
generation scheduling solution, interconnection import flows and wind generation level. 
Two patterns were picked up from the DS. They correspond to peak load hours, with identical 
operating conditions but with different dispatch solutions – one with a hydro based dispatch 
and the other with a thermal based dispatch. In these two patterns, an import level from area 2 
of 1400 MW is considered and approximately 2200 MW of DG power production is lost due 
to the simulated fault. In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 the pre-fault and post-fault values of the electrical 
line currents and active powers are presented for some main transmission lines (in p.u. 
regarding the summer load limit). 
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Fig. 3. Current and power flow results in some main transmission lines – pattern with hydro 
based dispatch 
Table I. Number of DS insecure patterns 
100% 120%
Thermal Summer
Hydro Winter
Thermal Summer
Hydro Summer
Thermal Winter
Hydro Winter 130 5
Security limitScheduling and 
dispatch scenario
electrical 
current limit
1390 280
3675 810
 
Table II. Number of DS patterns where 
insecurity  was identified for each
transmission line, regarding a security 
threshold of 100% the summer current limit 
Off-peak Peak Off-peak Peak
 1-3 57 - 1 -
 1-5 223 3 13 425
 1-7 - - 1 -
 15-16 219 480 148 525
 15-17 53 972 183 -
 17-16 - 57 15 -
 17-4 25 - 1 -
 16-4 93 - 3 2
 16-6 223 3 13 427
 14-18 28 226 336 53
 15-18 343 1198 621 65
 16-18 217 849 356 13
 18-19 - - - 5
 20-21 - 166 6 -
 25-9 - 1 - -
Transmission Line
Hydro based 
dispatch scen.
Thermal based 
dispatch scen.
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Fig. 4. Current and power flow results in some main transmission lines – pattern with thermal 
based dispatch 
As it can be seen from Fig. 3, for line 1-3, the hydro dispatch improves the security level 
because, as this line was initially exporting active power the power loss only provokes an 
exportation reduction. However, if a thermal dispatch solution exists (Fig. 4), which 
corresponds to generation mainly located in the South of area 1, this line is initially importing 
from area 2 and, therefore, the disturbance reduces this line security by increasing the 
importation level. For line 1-5, in both patterns, the disturbance increases the line importation 
level, and therefore, both cases lead to a reduction of the line security. However, the thermal 
dispatch is the worst case scenario because, in this case, the line is initially importing, 
whereas with hydro solution the line is initially exporting. For the remained analysed 
transmission lines, the hydro dispatch is the worst case, mainly because in this situation, these 
lines are initially more loaded. 
Fig. 5 presents the behaviour for the 
electrical current in line 15-17, 
following the considered disturbance, 
obtained from the pattern with hydro 
based dispatch with and without AGC 
operation. As it can be seen from this 
figure, by considering a line current 
security threshold of 120%, AGC 
operation avoids system insecurity for 
this line, since after 2 minutes the line 
current starts to become less than the 
operation limit. 
Next figures provide an impact sensitivity analysis, for line 16-18, regarding wind penetration 
in area 1 and import level from area 2. As it can be observed, there is a strong correlation 
(0.723) between the final current value and the initial global import level from area 2. Also, a 
strong correlation can be observed (0.933) between the increase of this line current and the 
wind penetration level in area 1. 
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Fig. 6. DS generated patterns for peak load and hydro dispatched based scenarios 
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Fig. 5. Behaviour of the electrical current in line 
15-17, obtained from the pattern with hydro based 
dispatch 
5.3 ANN RESULTS 
The structure of the designed ANN involves 87 inputs, 11 hidden units and 15 outputs (post-
fault values of the current on transmission lines presented in Table II). In order to evaluate the 
quality of this security structure, test set errors were computed for each ANN output, adopting 
a security threshold of 100% the summer current limit. The presented regression error (RE) is 
the Mean Square Error divided by the output variance. The presented classification errors are 
the Global, False Alarm and Missed Alarm errors. 
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Fig. 7. Test set regression and classification errors of the security structure 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The approach described in this paper develops a new dynamic security assessment concept 
and provides a new tool able to deal with the impact of the presence, in multi control area 
systems, of large shares of wind and other DG generation following system disturbances. This 
tool is able to provide, in a very fast way, a prediction about system robustness regarding 
disturbances that lead, namely, to the disconnection of large amounts of DG. From the results 
obtained it was possible to get insights on the operational variables that most affect security. 
The reduced testing errors obtained confirm the feasibility and quality of the approach and of 
the derived security assessment tool. 
Further research is being developed in order to exploit the ANN structure for the derivation of 
preventive control measures, in a similar way as described in [5] for isolated systems. 
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